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The security-sensitive counterpart to the fast, non-cryptographic Hash.* library: standard, test-vector-backed hashing for signed saves and message integrity, kept in its own namespace so nobody reaches for the wrong tool. Crypto.sha256(s) SHA-256 -> 64-char lowercase hex Crypto.hmac_sha256(key, msg) HMAC-SHA256 -> 64-char hex Crypto.verify_hmac(key, msg, mac) recompute + constant-time compare -> bool Crypto.hex(s) lowercase hex of a string's bytes Crypto.ct_equal(a, b) constant-time string equality The primitives are implemented from scratch in plain integer LLVM IR (FIPS 180-4 / RFC 2104): no libc crypto, no data-dependent branches in the compression rounds, so a given input hashes to the same 32 bytes on every platform and run. Digests are returned as hex strings, not raw bytes, because a `str` is null-terminated and a raw digest can contain a NUL. MAC checks use a non-short-circuiting compare so timing does not leak how much of a forged tag was correct. Emitted on demand via g_uses_cryptort, mirroring the emit_hash prelude gate. Scoped to the deterministic, known-answer-testable core; OS-backed random_bytes (the one piece that can't be validated by test vectors) is left for a follow-up. Tested against published SHA-256 vectors (empty/"abc"/fox + 55/56/64-byte multi-block padding) and HMAC-SHA256 vectors; wired into the self-host suite as `crypto`. Docs: a new Crypto section with honest "what this protects / does not" guidance, one page per method, all fences checked and in the inventory. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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1.1 KiB
| id | name | category | kind | tokens | sig | tip | order | ns | member |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| crypto-hmac_sha256 | Crypto.hmac_sha256 | crypto | namespace-method | Crypto.hmac_sha256 | Crypto.hmac_sha256(key, msg) -> string | Sign a message with a shared secret key. | 2 | Crypto | hmac_sha256 |
Computes HMAC-SHA256 over msg under the secret key (RFC 2104) and returns the 64-character lowercase hex tag. Unlike a bare hash, a MAC cannot be recomputed without the key, so it authenticates the message: attach the tag to a save file or a network packet, and a receiver who shares the key can tell whether the payload was altered or forged. To check the tag on the other side, pass it to Crypto.verify_hmac rather than comparing hex with ==.
Parameters:
key— the shared secret; keep it out of the shipped client where you canmsg— the payload being signed
program SignSave {
entry {
let key = "s3cret"
let payload = "score=9001;level=12"
let mac = Crypto.hmac_sha256(key, payload)
print(mac)
}
}